Rethinking real estate sales

Yes. Instead of an agent reaching out to you and trying to win you over, the roles are reversed: three pre-qualified top agents present themselves to you. Everyone knows they are competing against two others. This fundamentally changes the dynamic—the agent has to convince you, not the other way around.

Yes. Standard contracts—usually drafted by the Swiss Chamber of Real Estate Agents—are written in favor of the agent. Specifically, we warn against: The minimum price clause: The contract sets a minimum price that is significantly below the estimated value. The agent is entitled to a commission as soon as they find a buyer at this low price. The "target price" is merely decorative. The commission-without-sale clause: "If a buyer is introduced but rejected, the commission is still due." You would have to pay even if the buyer offers only a fraction of the estimated value. The excessive termination fee: Fixed sums of 4,000 or even 5,000 francs intended to discourage you from terminating the contract. Bestag has therefore developed its own contract. The agent only receives their fee upon the successful completion of a sale. No minimum price clause, no commission without results, and no excessive fees.

Yes. Unlike when you hire an agent on your own, Bestag provides you with a neutral second opinion. If, after several months, the agent says the price needs to be lowered, you can check with Bestag for reassurance. If the agent isn't showing much initiative, you have a partner who can apply pressure. You aren't facing the agent alone—and that is the whole point. Ultimately, as the owner, you are responsible for protecting your interests. Bestag helps you do exactly that.

Yes. That is the core of the Bestag model. In a traditional brokerage agreement, the agent receives their commission as soon as they find any buyer – regardless of the price. Their incentive is to close quickly, not to achieve the best price. Because whether they negotiate for 6 months longer to get 100,000 francs more only brings them 3,000 francs more at a 3% commission – in that same time, they could sell another property and earn 30,000 francs. The bonus-malus system reverses this incentive: if the broker sells above the estimated value, they receive, for example, 15% of the additional proceeds as a bonus. If they sell below it, 15% of the shortfall is deducted from their commission. With an estimated value of 1 million and a sale for 1.1 million, the commission rises from 30,000 to 45,000 francs. If it sells for only 900,000, it drops to 15,000. The broker therefore has a five-figure reason to negotiate hard and achieve the best possible price.

Exactly. That is a clever incentive design. Each of the three agents knows that two competitors are valuing the same property. This creates two opposing forces: Against overvaluation: Without a bonus-malus system, every agent would provide the highest possible valuation to win the listing. But the bonus-malus system penalizes this: anyone who estimates 1.1 million and then sells for only 950,000 loses a large portion of their commission due to a 15% penalty. Therefore, they provide a realistic estimate. Against undervaluation: Anyone who estimates significantly lower than the two competitors stands out and won't get the job. So, no agent artificially pushes the price down to make the work easier. The result: The three estimates converge on the actual market value—not because the agents want to be honest, but because the incentive structure penalizes dishonesty in both directions.

Yes. We explicitly recommend the right of first refusal as the fairest solution for intra-family sales—both for inheritances and for sales during one's lifetime. The property is offered on the market, and family members can acquire it by matching the highest third-party bid. This ensures that no one is disadvantaged and family harmony is preserved.